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We consider a labor market search model where, by working longer hours, in-
dividuals acquire greater skills and thereby obtain better jobs. We show that job
inequality, which leads to within-skill wage diﬀerences, gives incentives to work
longer hours. By contrast, a higher probability of losing jobs, a longer duration of
unemployment, and in general a less tight labor market discourage working time.
We show that the diﬀerent evolution of labor market conditions in the US and in
Continental Europe over the last three decades can quantitatively explain the di-
verging evolution of the number of hours worked per employee across the two sides
of the Atlantic. It can also explain why the fraction of prime age male workers
working very long hours has increased substantially in the US, after reverting a
trend of secular decline.
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In standard formulations of the competitive labor market model with time separable
utility, workers choose how many hours to work by equating the marginal utility of leisure
to the marginal value of current hourly wage. In practice, by working longer hours,
individuals can acquire greater skills, get promoted in the current job, and obtain better
jobs, so that working time also yields an intertemporal return. In this paper we show how
this return and hence working time decisions are aﬀected by several aggregate features of
the labor market.
Our model is an extension of the standard search model of unemployment originally
due to McCall (1970) where we allow for on-the-job search, a working hours decision, and
human capital accumulation. Workers (either employed or unemployed) can receive job
oﬀers from a given wage distribution.1 Thus there is wage dispersion and identical workers
can earn diﬀerent income. Workers are risk averse, so wage changes exert both an income
and a substitution eﬀect on working time decisions. In the model, hours worked increase
current as well as future income because by working longer hours individuals accumulate
human capital. Human capital enhances worker productivity and thereby the probability
of receiving job oﬀers. This follows, among others, Blanchard and Diamond (1994), Shi
(2002), and Shimer (2005a). The idea is that, due to a coordination problem, workers
may apply for the same job and applicants are ranked according to their productivity, so
more skilled workers are more likely to be oﬀered a job.2
We show that a rise in the dispersion of job oﬀers, which translates into higher within-
skill wage inequality, raises thegains from obtaining better jobs and gives workers greater
incentives to work longer hours. The eﬀect is stronger the tighter the labor market. In
contrast, a higher probability of becoming unemployed and a longer duration of unemploy-
ment reduce the rate of use of the stock of human capital accumulated through working
time and thereby reduce the incentive to work longer hours.
These links between labor market conditions and working time decisions can help to
explain why, since the 70’s, the number of hours worked per employee has fallen substan-
tially in Continental Europe (Germany, France, Italy and Spain), while it has remained
1Postulating an exogenous wage distribution has some key advantages given that we are interested
in comparing (Continental) Europe to the US. Indeed wage determination may diﬀer substantially in
Continental Europe and in the US. Moreover the wage distribution has evolved diﬀerently over time across
the two sides of the Atlantic and there is yet no consensus of why this happened, see Hornstein, Krusell,
and Violante (2005) for a survey on possible explanations and the Conclusions for further discussion.
2Indeed, it is well known that unemployment rates are lower for more skilled workers. Blau and Robins
(1990) provide direct evidence that more skilled workers receive more job oﬀers.
1roughly constant in the US after reverting a trend of secular decline.3 Indeed, over the
same period, wage inequality and unemployment have also evolved quite diﬀerently across
the two sides of the Atlantic. In particular, as reviewed among others by Bean (1994),
Gottschalk and Smeeding (1997) and Katz and Autor (1999), it is well known that both
the return to skill and within-skill wage inequality have increased substantially in the US
but little in Europe, while the unemployment rate has increased considerably in Europe
but it has remained roughly constant in the US. Figure 1 provides suggestive evidence that
trend diﬀerences in hours per worker may be related to changes in aggregate labor market
conditions. We plot the percentage change in hours worked per employee for selected
OECD countries against the changes in earnings inequality (panel a) and in unemploy-
ment rate (panel b), respectively. Earnings inequality is measured as the log diﬀerence
between the ninth and the ﬁrst decile of the distribution of gross earnings of full-time
workers in their main job. Changes are calculated over the 1970-2002 period. The ﬁgure
indicates that hours per worker have fallen more in countries that have experienced a
smaller increase in inequality and a sharper rise in unemployment.4
To quantify the contribution of labor market conditions to the widening gap in hours
per worker between the US and Europe emerged since the 70’s, we consider an extended
model that we calibrate to match a variety of statistics on labor ﬂows and wage dynamics
at the micro level. We focus on prime age male workers because these workers are likely to
actively engage in the labor market. We analyze the eﬀects of increasing the return to skill
and within-skill wage inequality so as to match the rise in wage inequality experienced by
the US since the 70’s. We then analyze the eﬀects of reducing job oﬀer probabilities so
as to reproduce the raise in European unemployment over the last thirty years. We ﬁnd
that labor market conditions (in terms of inequality and unemployment) can account for
the US-EU diﬀerences in hours per worker emerged over the last thirty years.
Our theory predicts that individuals work longer hours when wage inequality is higher.
This is consistent with the ﬁnding by Bell and Freeman (2001) who show that, both in
the US and in Germany, occupations with larger wage inequality are also occupations in
which individuals work longer hours. This is also consistent with the timing of changes
in US aggregate data: after remaining stable for some decades, wage inequality started
to increase in the early 70s (Eckstein and Nagypal 2004), about at the same time when
3See for example OECD (2004, chap. 1) and Table 1 below. The divergence in hours per worker
between the US and Europe started in the 70’s. In the 50’s the Americans were working even less hours
than the Europeans, see for example Bell and Freeman (1995).
4The correlation between changes in hours worked and changes in income inequality and unemployment
changes is around plus and minus sixty percent, respectively. Both are statistically signiﬁcant at a ﬁve
percent level of signiﬁcance.
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Notes: Changes over the 1970-2002 period. Source OECD, see “http://www.oecd.org”. Changes in Hours per Worker are
percentage changes in the average annual hours worked per employee in the 1970-2002 period. Changes in the unemployment
rate are level variations over the same period. Changes in income inequality are calculated as variations in the log diﬀerence
of the ninth and the ﬁrst decile of the distribution of gross earnings in the main job of full-time workers; the sample period
used diﬀers because of data availability. We always select the available data closest to 2002 and to 1970, respectively.
hours per male worker reverted a trend of secular decline and also started to increase
(McGrattan and Rogerson 2004). In accordance with the interpretation, Kuhn and Lozano
(2005) document that the increase in the number of US workers working long hours has
been more pronounced in occupations, industries and groups of workers (such as highly
educated and high wage earners) who also experienced higher increases in wage inequality.
The trend reversal in hours per worker in the US is so far unexplained and it is a major
puzzle for theories that focus just on Europe to explain the widening gap in hours per
worker between the US and Europe.
The model also predicts that, due to within-skill wage inequality, the intertemporal re-
turn to working time has increased in the US since the 70’s, while it has remained roughly
constant in Europe. Following Bell and Freeman (2001), we measure the intertemporal
return by looking at the (conditional) correlation of past hours with current wages. Using
data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), and the German Socio-Economic
Panel (GSOEP), we show that the intertemporal return to working time has indeed in-
creased in the US since the 70’s, while it has remained roughly constant in Germany
(at least since the mid 80’s, which is when the GSOEP starts), in a way quantitatively
consistent with our model.
Furthermore the theory predicts that the biggest changes in hours per worker should
have occurred for mid-career workers. These are the workers who are most sensitive to
3changes in labor market conditions. At the end of the working career, hours decisions
are instead simply driven by the intratemporal return. We show that current diﬀerences
in hours per worker in the US and in Germany are indeed tiny for male workers at late
stages of their working career. McGrattan and Rogerson (2004) and data from the PSID
also show that, in the US, mid-career workers have experienced the sharpest increase in
hours per male worker since the 70’s.
The idea that labor market conditions play a role in explaining working time diﬀer-
ences is novel. Prescott (2004) attributes the relative fall in hours worked in Europe to the
sharp increase in taxes experienced by several European countries. This tends to reduce
the net return to hours worked and discourages working time. We provide evidence that
the gross return to working longer hours has evolved diﬀerently across the two sides of
the Atlantic. This suggests that taxes can not be the only reason why working time has
evolved diﬀerently.5 Since US marginal tax rates have changed little over the period, the
tax story has also problems in explaining the trend reversal in hours per worker experi-
enced by the US since the 70’s. Blanchard (2004) argues that Europeans work less than
Americans because they have a stronger preference toward leisure. In our model this hap-
pens not because Europeans are intrinsically diﬀerent from Americans, but because they
lack career prospects due to the sluggish labor market. Alesina, Glaeser, and Sacerdote
(2005) argue that trade unions introduced work sharing arrangements. They restricted
the number of hours per worker so as to sustain a higher employment level. Our analysis
suggests that the observed diﬀerent evolution of wage inequality and unemployment in
the US and the EU, could simply be part of a trade unions’ attempt to make work sharing
politically sustainable. Working time restrictions, imposed by law or collective bargaining
agreements, become incentive compatible because Europeans do not prefer to work longer
hours given the existing labor market conditions.6
The idea that hours worked increase worker’s human capital is not entirely novel.
The idea has been formally put forward, in the context of a competitive labor market
model, by Shaw (1989) and Imai and Keane (2004). Olivetti (2006) has also used the
idea to explain the recent rise in female labor force participation. In all these models the
intertemporal return to working time is just determined by the elasticity of productivity
5The Prescott’s analysis has recently been questioned either because it hinges on a high elasticity
of labor supply (Blanchard 2004) or because it fails to be consistent with some panel data estimates
(Nickell 2003) or because it yields counterfactual implications when the eﬀects of taxes and unemployment
beneﬁts are analyzed jointly (Ljungqvist and Sargent 2007).
6OECD (1998, chap. 5) reports that the diﬀerence between actual and desired working time is generally
small for European workers and it has even decreased over the last decades. Bell and Freeman (2001)
also document that the fraction of workers that would prefer to work longer hours for given hourly wages
is even higher in the US than in Germany.
4to the human capital accumulated through working hours. We show that, in a labor
market with search frictions, several other salient features of the labor market aﬀects this
return. In particular, we ﬁnd that within-skill wage inequality accounts for a major part
of the observed intertemporal return in working time and for its evolution over time.
The plan of the paper is as follows. The next section introduces a simple model that
highlights how labor market variables aﬀect working time decisions. The model is ex-
tended in Section 3 and parameterized in Section 4. Section 5 quantiﬁes the role of labor
market conditions in accounting for the US-EU experience. Section 6 looks at some addi-
tional testable implications of the theory. Section 7 considers some robustness exercises.
Section 8 concludes. The Appendix provides details on data and model computation.
2 A two-period stylized model
In this section we study how labor market conditions aﬀect the intertemporal return to
hours worked and the choice of hours. We do so in a purposely very stylized model that
highlights some basic forces. The model will also suggest some natural ways to identify
key parameters of the general model for the quantitative analysis presented in Section 3.
The economy lasts for two periods. In the ﬁrst period workers are employed with
human capital H ∈ R+. By working h hours they produce an amount of eﬃciency units
of labor Hαhθ. The job remunerates eﬃciency units of work at rate ω. We refer to ω as to
the wage rate of the job. So the worker’s income is ωHαhθ. Next period’s stock of human
capital H0 is related to the number of hours worked in the current period: H0 = ah. Here
for simplicity we are assuming that human capital fully depreciates in a period.
Next period, workers are unemployed with probability ρ. In practice ρ is the joint
probability that a worker becomes unemployed and that he does not ﬁnd a new job in the
period. Thus ρ is increasing in the job separation probability and decreasing in the job
ﬁnding probability. An unemployed worker obtains income (and leisure) worth b in utility
terms. If the job is not destroyed, the worker can receive a job oﬀer from a ﬁrm that
pays a wage ω0. Job oﬀers are received with probability pe (H0), which is increasing in
the worker’s human capital H0. The job oﬀer probability pe should be interpreted as the
product of a parameter related to labor market tightness and a term that characterizes
the eﬀects of human capital on search activity. There are several reasons why human
capital may help in getting job oﬀers. One is that more skilled workers may be more
eﬃcient at job searching activities. Another is that, due to a coordination problem as in
Blanchard and Diamond (1994), Shi (2002), and Shimer (2005a), workers may apply for
the same job and applicants are ranked according to their productivity, so more skilled
5workers are more likely to be oﬀered a job.7
Job oﬀers are a random draw from a given wage distribution F (ω). The distribution F
captures within-skill wage inequality. In equilibrium workers will accept oﬀers whenever
ω0 > ω. For simplicity we assume that the wage oﬀer distribution is discrete with mass
1 − q at ω1 and q at ω2 > ω1. Preferences over consumption and leisure are given by
u(c,λh) = lnc − λh
where λ > 0 measures the eﬀort cost of working. This choice of preferences implies
that the income and the substitution eﬀects cancel out exactly, so that permanent wage
changes have no eﬀects on hours worked. For simplicity we assume that workers do not
save and can not borrow. Therefore, consumption is simply equal to labor income.
















which yields h0 = θ
λ. In the ﬁrst period, a worker with human capital H, who currently
receives wage ω ∈ {ω1,ω2}, chooses hours by solving the following Bellman equation:
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subject to H0 = ah. Using our simple wage oﬀer distribution we can rewrite V1 (H,ω) as
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This says that hours worked are chosen by equating the marginal disutility of working to
its marginal return. The marginal return is the sum of the value of the marginal increase in
7Blau and Robins (1990) provide direct evidence that more skilled workers receive more job oﬀers.
Here we model ranking and the eﬀects of skill on job oﬀers probabilities in reduced form. Montgomery
(1991) and Peters (1991) provide an explicit probabilistic model, known as the urn-ball process, that leads
to a coordination problem in job applications and to ranking of applicants. Reduced-form functions have
been used before by Acemoglu (2001), Acemoglu and Shimer (2001), Michelacci and Suarez (2006), and
Mortensen and Wright (2002).
6current income, equal to θ/h, and the expected marginal increase in future income—which
corresponds to the second term in the right hand side of equation (2). This intertemporal
return to hours worked is aﬀected by the rate of utilization of human capital (1−ρ), the
productivity elasticity to human capital α, and by the expected increase in income due
to job oﬀers. It is to this second channel that inequality in jobs is related.
To obtain an explicit expression for h we log-linearize the function describing the job
oﬀer probability:
pe (H






where H is an appropriately deﬁned constant while p1 is the semi elasticity of the job
oﬀer probability to human capital. In general p1 is higher in a tighter labor market, since
search eﬃciency units are marginally more eﬀective when labor market tightness rises.
This allows to solve for h so as to obtain that
h =
θ + β (1 − ρ)[α + p1 q (lnω2 − lnω)]
λ
. (4)
Notice that the intra-temporal return to hours worked (the ﬁrst term in the numerator
of the right-hand side of the equation) is independent of ω. This is because with log
preferences the income and the substitution eﬀect cancel out. The intertemporal return
to hours worked (the second term in the numerator) increases with the semilestacity of
the job oﬀer probability with respect to human capital p1 and with the dispersion of job
oﬀers (lnω2 − lnω). A higher p1 implies that hours worked are marginally more valuable
in obtaining better jobs, while a greater dispersion makes these jobs more valuable. The
two eﬀects interact with each other and encourage working time. The intertemporal
return to hours worked is also decreasing in the unemployment probability ρ, because a
higher ρ reduces the rate of use of the stock of human capital H0, while it is increasing in
the productivity elasticity to human capital α. This last would be the only determinant
of the intertemporal return in a competitive labor market model, as in Shaw (1989) and
Imai and Keane (2004). Thus hours worked increase when:
1. the labor market gets tighter—i.e. when the unemployment probability ρ falls or p1
increases.
2. the productivity elasticity to human capital α rises.
3. within-skill wage inequality, modeled as a mean preserving spread in the wage oﬀer
distribution F, increases.
73 The general model
To quantitatively study how much the change in labor market conditions can explain of
the diﬀerent evolution of hours per worker in the US and Europe, we now extend the model
in several directions. First, we allow individuals to experience recurrent unemployment
spells. Second, we allow for an endogenous unemployment exit probability; third for a
downward trend in hours worked; and ﬁnally we specify more general functional forms for
preferences and technology. The ﬁrst extension is introduced to separately analyze the
eﬀects of the job separation rate and the job ﬁnding rate on working time decisions. The
second implies that unemployment exit rates are aﬀected by workers’ reservation wages
and human capital. The third is introduced to match the secular downward trend in hours
per worker observed in the data, see for example McGrattan and Rogerson (2004). The
last extension is introduced to match key features of the data.
3.1 Model description
Workers are inﬁnitely lived. An employed worker is characterized by her stock of human
capital H ∈ R+ and by the job wage rate ω ∈ R+. When employed, the worker decides how
many hours to work. Hours of work generate a ﬂow of income ωHα(ath)θ in the current
period and increase the stock of human capital in the next period according to H0 =
(1 − δ)H + ath, where at characterizes labor augmenting technological progress (which
increases the eﬀectiveness of any source of eﬃciency units of labor used in production)
while δ ∈ [0,1] represents the depreciation rate of human capital.
As previously discussed, human capital aﬀects the probability of receiving job oﬀers.
We assume that the job oﬀer probability for an unemployed worker (i = u) and an
employed worker (i = e) is given by
pi (H,G) = ¯ pi S(H,G), i = u,e (5)
Here ¯ pi measures how labor market tightness aﬀects the job contact rate that may diﬀer
depending on the employment state of the worker. The function S (H,G) instead char-
acterizes how human capital helps in getting job oﬀers. The function is increasing in
worker’s human capital H. It is also decreasing in the cumulative distribution function
of workers’ human capital in the economy, G, that is when G shifts to the right (i.e. it
becomes stochastically greater), the job oﬀer probability falls. This is because, a worker
with given human capital has to compete with relatively more skilled workers for the
same jobs—so that he becomes less likely to be oﬀered a job when competing against
8other applicants.
Job oﬀers are drawn from a given distribution F, which is log normal with variance





. This implies that the wage oﬀer distribution has mean one and
that changes in ν generate mean-preserving spreads of F. An employed worker loses her
job with probability ps. Since we will focus on steady state allocations, we omit the
distribution G from the state space of the worker’s problem. Her problem when employed
can then be expressed in terms of the following Bellman equation:
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subject to: H0 = (1 − δ)H + ath. Here λt measures the eﬀort cost of working at time





is the value of becoming unemployed at time t+1, which depends
on time (because of the possible time changing values of at and λt), on the next period
worker’s human capital, H0, and on the utility ﬂow of a worker who has just become
unemployed ¯ b0. Notice that a worker accepts only job oﬀers that yield an increase in
utility. This accounts for the integral term in the second row.
An unemployed worker who has experienced τ periods in unemployment obtains in-
come (and leisure) worth bτ in utility terms. We assume this value to fall over time so
that bτ = ¯ b0 − ¯ b1τ. This can capture the fact that income during unemployment (due
to precautionary savings, unemployment beneﬁts or extended-family transfers) gets pro-
gressively exhausted as a worker remains unemployed.8 The problem of an unemployed
worker is then characterized by the following Bellman equation:
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subject to H0 = (1 − δ)H and b0 = b − ¯ b1. Notice that an unemployed worker accepts
only wage oﬀers above the (endogenously determined) critical threshold ωr.
8Notice that under log preferences ¯ b1 is simply the rate of decay of unemployment income.
93.2 Functional forms
At every point in time, preferences for consumption and leisure are given by




, η ≥ 0,
where η determines the sensitivity of the marginal disutility of working to hours worked.
To make the environment stationary we assume that λt and at grow at the constant rate
µ, so that λt = (1 + µ)tλ and at = (1 + µ)ta for any t. We assume µ to be positive in
order to match the observed secular downward trend in hours worked for male workers.9
Search eﬃciency units are given by the following logistic function that parsimoniously
characterizes some key features of the ranking process of job applicants:
S (H,G) =
4
1 + e−γ[H−ψ(G)], γ ≥ 0.
The function is characterized by a human capital sensitivity parameter γ and by a shift
parameter ψ (G), which is a function of the equilibrium distribution of human capital G.
A value of γ equal to zero implies that human capital has no eﬀect on search activities.
Formally γ measures the maximal value of the derivative of search eﬃciency units to
capital (which is maximized at H = ψ (G)).10 The parameter ψ (G) characterizes workers’
competition for jobs and it tends to increase (so S falls for given H) when the human
capital distribution of workers G shifts to the right. Notice that the logistic function
imposes the property that human capital generates marginally more job oﬀers at an
average human capital value than at an extreme value (belonging to either tail of the
human capital distribution). For example the semielasticity of search eﬃciency to human
capital (i.e. the analogue of p1 in Section 2) goes to zero when human capital goes to
either zero or inﬁnity. This property captures the idea that marginally increasing human
capital yields more job oﬀers, only when it gives the worker a productivity edge over a
9We model the secular trend in hours by relying on labor augmenting technological progress rather than
by assuming ongoing neutral technological progress and preferences where the income eﬀect dominates
the substitution eﬀect. This model choice is partly due to the partial equilibrium nature of the model.
In our model, when the income eﬀect dominates the substitution eﬀect, any parameter change (including
an increase in the variance of the wage oﬀer distribution) leads to changes in average wages, which tends
to aﬀect hours worked. This partial equilibrium eﬀect, however, would tend to dissipate in a general
equilibrium version of the model were ﬁrms demand workers and capital and wages and the rental price
of capital are set endogenously.
10Notice that the function does not impose any bounds to the value of the semi-elasticity of search
eﬃciency to human capital, (i.e. to the value of p1 in Section 2). Instead imposing a generic concave
function with positive intercept would implicitly limit the value of the semi-elasticity at given levels of
the stock of human capital and of job oﬀer probability.
10signiﬁcant mass of workers, which is a general feature of any ranking model. We will start
considering a speciﬁcation where ψ (G) = ¯ H ≡
R
HdG, which implies that the marginal
eﬀect of human capital on the job oﬀer probability is maximized at the average human
capital in the population. This is a reasonable assumption if the distribution of human
capital is concentrated around its mean. In Section 7 we will consider some alternative
speciﬁcations for the function ψ.
3.3 Model solution
To make the environment stationary, we re-express the worker’s problem in terms of
detrended hours b ht ≡ ht(1+µ)t. The solution can then be described by a pair of stationary
decision rules, one for detrended hours b h(H,ω), and the other for the reservation wage
of an unemployed worker ωr (H,b), see Appendix B for details. The steady state of the
economy is characterized by a constant unemployment rate and by unique time-invariant
distributions of human capital and wage rate for employed workers, and of human capital
and unemployment utility for unemployed workers.
Figure 2 characterizes the policy function for detrended hours worked, b h. The solid line
in Panel (a) (and in the other three panels) represents b h as a function of relative human
capital, H− ¯ H, at ω = ω50, which corresponds to the median of the wage oﬀer distribution.
The decision rule is hump-shaped because the semielasticity of the job oﬀer probability
to human capital (i.e p1 in Section 2) declines as human capital tends to move away
from its average in the population. The policy function reaches its maximum at a human
capital value smaller than the average because, with less than full capital depreciation, a
marginal increase in hours yields smaller percentage increases in human capital at higher
human capital levels—which reduces the marginal return to hours worked. If we think
that individuals are born with a relatively low human capital level that they progressively
increase as they participate in the labor market, this shape is consistent with the age
proﬁle of hours worked found in the data, which tends to peak for middle age workers,
see for example McGrattan and Rogerson (2004) and Section 6.
The dotted line in Panel (a) represents the policy function at a higher ω = ω90, which
corresponds to the ninetieth percentile of the wage oﬀer distribution. Since the expected
gain of switching job falls with ω, workers with higher ω work fewer hours. The diﬀerence
in hours worked is less pronounced at extreme human capital values, since in either tail
of the human capital distribution the semielasticity of the job oﬀer probability to human
capital tends to converge to zero. Figure 2 also shows the eﬀects on hours worked of
increasing the dispersion of job oﬀers, ν, (Panel b), of increasing the productivity elasticity
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Notes: Solid line corresponds to the policy function of (detrended) hours worked, b h, as a function of relative
human capital H − ¯ H at ω = ω50, which corresponds to the median of the wage oﬀer distribution. The
parameter values are as given in Table 3 where ψ = ¯ H. The dotted line in the four panels represents the policy
function at a higher ω = ω90 corresponding to the ninetieth percentile of the wage oﬀer distribution (Panel a),
at a higher ν = 0.55 (Panel b), at an higher α = 0.35 (Panel c) and at a lower ¯ pe = 0.65 (Panel d), respectively.
to human capital, α, (Panel c) and of reducing labor market tightness so that the job oﬀer
probability for an employed worker falls, ¯ pe, (Panel d). The eﬀects of reducing ¯ pu would
be similar to those of ¯ pe and are omitted to save space. An increase in either ν or
α shifts the policy function upwards and increases the incentives to work longer hours,
whereas a reduction in ¯ pe shifts the policy function downwards and discourages individuals
from working longer hours. The eﬀects are relatively more pronounced at human capital
levels below the average in the population. This is because, at higher human capital
levels, marginally increasing hours has smaller percentage eﬀects on human capital which
makes the intertemporal return to hours worked less sensitive to any parameters’ change.
Moreover, at very high level of human capital the eﬀects are almost absent. This is
because the semielasticity of the job oﬀer probability to human capital is close to zero
and the return to working time is mainly intratemporal.
124 The quantitative exercise
We ﬁrst describe the evolution of aggregate hours worked in the US and Europe over the
last thirty years. We show that hours per worker (the so called intensive margin) plays
a very important role in explaining the aggregate trend in hours. We then discuss how
we quantify the role played by labor market conditions in accounting for the diverging
evolution of the intensive margin across the two sides of the Atlantic.
4.1 The evolution of hours worked
In the model aggregate hours per worker is given by






where b h denotes detrended hours worked and Γ(H,ω) is the probability measure of em-
ployed workers with human capital H and wage rate ω in steady state. Hours per worker
















where the ﬁrst fraction denotes hours per worker, the second denotes one minus the
unemployment rate, the third the participation rate, while the fourth is the fraction of
working age population over the total population. The percentage changes of the various
components underlying the dynamics of hours per capita over the period 1970-2001 for
the US and some other countries are summarized in the diﬀerent columns of Table 1. We
present results both for the whole population (left panels) and for the population of male
workers (right panels). The top panels report observed percentage changes, the bottom
panels report changes relative to the US (by normalizing to zero the corresponding change
in the US). The table evidences how the intensive margin accounts for around 50 percent
of the trend diﬀerences in hours per capita between the US and France, Germany, and
Spain. This is true when considering the population of both all workers and male workers
only. Interestingly, hours per male worker have increased by 4.5 percentage points in the
US while they have fallen by around 10 percentage points in France and Germany.
We now use the model to quantify how much labor market conditions can explain
of the diﬀerent evolution of hours per worker in the US and Europe. As in Prescott
(2004) and Ljungqvist and Sargent (2007) we take the US as the benchmark economy
against which to measure the eﬀects of aggregate changes on hours worked. The idea is
13Table 1: Evolution of aggregate hours worked, (1970-2001)






















US 15 -5 0 13 7 7 4.5 -.5 -5 8
France -22 -23 -6 3 4 -24 -10 -5 -13 4
Germany -24 -26 -7 4 6 -24 -11 -5 -16 8
Spain -6 -14 -9 10 10 -23 -12 -7 -16 12
UK -8 -12 -3 4 4 -10 -2 -2 -10 4
Percentage changes relative to the US
US 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
France -37 -17 -6 -10 -3 -31 -14.5 -4.5 -8 -4
Germany -39 -21 -7 -9 -1 -31 -15.5 -4.5 -11 0
Spain -21 -9 -9 -3 3 -30 -16.5 -6.5 -11 4
UK -23 -7 -3 -9 -3 -17 -6.5 -1.5 -5 -4
Notes: The table presents the percentage changes over the 1970-2001 period of hours per capita ( hour
pop ), hours per worker
( hour
emp ), one minus the unemployment rate (
emp
part), the participation rate (
part
wa ) and the working age population ( wa
pop). The
left panels deal with the population of all workers, the right panels with the men only population. The top panels report
observed percentage changes, the bottom panels report changes relative to the US. For the population of All workers hour
emp
is the average actual annual hours worked per person in employment, while for the men only population it is the average
number of hours paid per week and it is from ILO and McGrattan and Rogerson (2004). All the other data are from the
OECD. The data for Germany refer to former Federal Republic.
to evaluate how US workers would have behaved if they had been subject to the same
changes in labor market conditions as the Europeans had. We focus the analysis on prime
age male workers because they are most likely to be actively engaged in the labor market,
which is a decision neglected by the model. We calibrate the model to moment conditions
in the 70’s (which will correspond to t = 0) and we then analyze how changes in labor
market conditions aﬀect the intensive margin in 2000, taking into account changes in
policy functions and in the probability distribution of employed workers Γ. We think of
the US as an economy that, over the 1970-2000 period, has experienced an increase in
within skill wage inequality and in the return to skill, which we model through an increase
in the variance of job oﬀers, F, and in the productivity elasticity to human capital α.
We think of Europe as an economy where a fall in labor market tightness has reduced
the worker probability of receiving job oﬀers so that ¯ pe and ¯ pu have both fallen. Wage
inequality in Europe has instead changed little.
144.2 The baseline economy
The model is described by 15 parameters. Except for 3 parameters that are chosen by
either using a normalization condition or relying on previous estimates (see below), the
model is calibrated to match moment conditions on labor ﬂows and wage dynamics at
the micro level. In particular we solve the model and compute statistics on the model
simulated data at the same frequency and exactly as in the actual data—a process that
can be seen as estimation by indirect inference, see for example Gouri´ eroux, Monfort, and
Renault (1993). We choose a model period to correspond to one month. Calibrating the
model at a quarterly or at an even lower frequency would fail to properly characterize
key labor market transitions. For instance, according to Shimer (2005b) and Fallick and
Fleischman (2001), the average duration of unemployment is between 2 and 3 months. We
start discussing the calibration of the economy in the 70’s and then turn to the 00’s. To
help the reader, the targets used and the model ﬁt are reported in Table 2, the calibrated
parameters for the economy in the 70’s are listed in Table 3, while the parameters for the
00’s appear in Table 7.
Table 2: Model and data statistics for the 70’s
Statistic Data Model
Bench. Fxd het Lwr γ Mode Gtr η
Average separation rate 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.013
Avge. prob. leaving unemployment 0.333 0.334 0.337 0.333 0.332 0.341
Average prob. of a job-to-job transition 0.028 0.028 0.028 0.028 0.028 0.028
Elasticity of job-to-job transition to past hours 0.030 0.030 0.030 -0.135 0.030 0.030
Avge. acceptance rate of oﬀers by unemployed 0.750 0.749 0.758 0.755 0.755 0.724
Fraction of long term unemployed (τ > 22 m) 0.034 0.035 0.059 0.029 0.035 0.093
Standard deviation of reemployment wages 0.500 0.503 0.498 0.500 0.494 0.500
Elasticity wage losses wrt. duration 0.080 0.083 0.046 0.071 0.084 0.007
Wage growth on change of current hours -0.700 -0.684 -0.687 -0.699 -0.684 -0.689
Wage growth on change of human capital 0.040 0.042 0.039 0.045 0.041 0.037
Trend in hours per worker in the job (1950-70) 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.033
Average hours per worker in the job 0.400 0.399 0.400 0.400 0.407 0.399
Five-year autocorrelation of hourly wages 0.600 0.180 0.601 0.193 0.178 0.193
Notes: The column labeled “Bench.” refers to the benchmark speciﬁcation described in Section 4. The other columns refer
to the extensions discussed in Section 7.
Labor market transitions. In the model there are three transition probabilities char-
acterized by four parameters, ps, ¯ pu, ¯ pe, and γ. To identify the ﬁrst three parameters
we look at average labor market ﬂows. Fallick and Fleischman (2001) calculate, for male
workers, the job separation rate (i.e. the rate at which employed workers move into un-
employment), the job ﬁnding rate for the unemployed and the job to job rate for the
15Table 3: Parameter values in the 70’s
Parameter Value
Bench. Fxd het Lwr γ Mode Gtr η
ps, separation probability 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.013
¯ pu, tightness parameter, unemployed 0.280 0.288 0.261 0.296 0.303
¯ pe, tightness parameter, employed 0.212 0.202 0.217 0.221 0.203
γ, job oﬀers sensitivity to human capital 10.103 12.762 7.5 9.537 14.540
¯ b0, initial unemployment utility -1.071 -1.043 -1.299 -1.051 -0.897
¯ b1, rate of decay of unemployment utility 0.015 0.018 0.003 0.018 0.020
ν, variance of job oﬀer distribution 0.348 0.162 0.370 0.334 0.334
δ, depreciation of human capital 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.013
θ, elasticity of income to hours 0.300 0.300 0.300 0.300 0.300
α, elasticity of income to human capital 0.040 0.040 0.040 0.040 0.040
a, learning-by-doing rate 0.034 0.034 0.034 0.034 0.034
µ, trend in hours worked (×10−4) 1.485 1.485 1.485 1.485 1.485
β, discount factor 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99
λ, weight of leisure 2.436 2.326 2.313 2.393 2.543
η, curvature of disutility of working 2 2 2 2 3
σ2
υ, variance of ﬁxed eﬀect 0 0.116 0 0 0
Notes: The column labeled “Bench.” refers to the benchmark speciﬁcation described in Section 4. The other four columns
refer to the extensions discussed in Section 7. The parameter σ2
υ is described in Section 7.
employed. At the monthly level the job separation rate is around 1.3% and the job ﬁnd-
ing probability for an unemployed worker is around 1/3, which is in line with the value
reported by Shimer (2005b) when considering an analogous worker population. They also
report that every month 2.8% of male workers experience a job-to-job transition. We
interpret the event of accepting a new job oﬀer when employed as a job to job transition.
To identify γ—which determines how human capital aﬀects the job oﬀers probability—
we use panel data to estimate a relationship between past hours worked and the probability
of a job-to-job transition. We construct a dummy variable that equals one if the individual
experiences a job-to-job transition in the following year. We regress this variable against
the log of the average hours worked by the individual over the past ﬁve years:
job-to-job = cons. + ϕ1 lnh (8)
Intuitively a positive ϕ1 means that past hours worked increases the probability of a job
to job transition. Table 4 presents the results from estimating the equation on US data
coming from the Michigan Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). We focus on male
households heads and, since we need yearly observations, we use data only up to 1997
(data are biannual thereafter). We consider two measures for hours worked. The ﬁrst
denoted Yearly hours is the total annual hours worked for money by the worker in any
job. The second denoted Weekly hours is the number of hours usually worked per week
16Table 4: Hours worked and job-to-job transitions
(a) PSID (b) GSOEP
Hours measure Hours measure
Annual Usual weekly Annual Usual weekly
Log past hours 0.03 0.02 log past hours 0.05 0.07
(4.22) (2.64) (4.37) (5.46)
Notes: Panel (a) deals with PSID, Panel (b) with GSOEP. OLS regressions. t-statistics in parentheses. All regressions
include year and education dummies and potential experience (in levels and squared). Hours are measured as ﬁve years
averages.
in the main job. In the regressions we also control for education and experience. These
controls have no counterpart in our simple model, but are regarded as important in the
empirical literature.11 To check robustness we also report results on German data coming
from the German Socioeconomic Panel (GSOEP). Appendix A contains further details
about the two data sets.
When using the PSID, we ﬁnd a value for ϕ1 around 0.03. When we look at the
GSOEP, we ﬁnd that ϕ1 lies between 0.06 and 0.07. In both cases the estimate is positive
and statistically signiﬁcant. Our estimate for γ is done by indirect inference. We simulate
individual data from the model, we aggregate the job to job transitions and hours worked
at the annual frequency, we construct ﬁve year averages of hours worked and we then run
the same regression as in the PSID data but on model generated data. We choose γ so
that the estimated coeﬃcient ϕ1 in model generated data is equal to its analogue in the
PSID.12
Unemployment utility. To set ¯ b0, the utility value of unemployment upon job loss,
and ¯ b1, the rate of decay of the value of being unemployed, we target the acceptance
rate of job oﬀers for unemployed workers and the share of long term unemployment. The
idea is that ¯ b0 determines how appealing is a job oﬀer relative to unemployment, while
11To check robustness of results we also ran regressions after controlling for tenure in the job. We
found that results change little.
12Of course the estimate of ϕ1 could be driven by some individual ﬁxed eﬀects present in the data
but not in the model (say because some skilled workers work longer hours and also experience more
job-to-job transitions). This may bias our estimate of γ. To analyze this concern we considered several
robustness exercises. We re-estimated equation (8) either by controlling for hourly wages in the current
job or by adding a random ﬁxed eﬀect. The estimate for ϕ1 changes little, which suggests that individual
unobserved heterogeneity does not drive the estimate of ϕ1. As discussed in Section 7, we also tried to
add to the model individual ﬁxed eﬀects, so as to make the model structure closer to the data. We ﬁnd
that, under this alternative speciﬁcation, the quantitative results change little, which is again reassuring
on our strategy to identify γ.
17¯ b1 determines how the acceptance rate changes as a worker remains in unemployment,
which is a determinant of long term unemployment. Our target for the acceptance rate is
a compromise between the value reported by Blau and Robins (1990)—who use workers
data and ﬁnd an acceptance rate of around 70 percent—and the one by Barron, Bishop,
and Dunkelberg (1985)—who use employer data and ﬁnd a value of 80 percent. We
obtain a measure of the fraction of long-term unemployed by using the CPS-March ﬁle.
We deﬁne as long term unemployed, workers who have experienced at least 22 months,
which is the value at which the CPS censors the unemployment duration variable. For
prime age males we ﬁnd that the fraction of long term unemployed is around 3.4%.
Wage Oﬀer distribution. Following den Berg and Ridder (1998) and Postel-Vinay
and Robin (2002), we choose the dispersion in the wage oﬀer distribution, ν, to match
the dispersion of start-up wages after an unemployment spell. The idea is that the wage
oﬀer distribution has greater eﬀects on start-up wages than on overall wages. 13 Table 5
present the evolution of the dispersion of re-employment wages in the PSID and in the
GSOEP. In the US, we measure the standard deviation of log wages after unemployment
to be around 0.5 in the 70’s.14
Table 5: Dynamics of SD of start-up wages after unemployment
(a) PSID (b) GSOEP
Controls included Controls included
Year More Year More
SD3,70−80 0.52 0.49 – – –
SD3,81−90 0.62 0.58 SD3,84−91 0.43 0.43
SD3,91−02 0.77 0.70 SD3,92−02 0.43 0.42
n 55,000 54,681 n 6,321 6,321
Notes: Panel (a) deals with PSID, Panel (b) with GSOEP. Standard Deviation of logged real hourly wage of workers who
experienced an unemployment spell in the year. In column 2 we also control for years and education dummies, tenure (in
levels and squared) and potential experience (in levels and squared).
Technology. We have ﬁve technology parameters: the contribution of hours to human
capital accumulation a, the depreciation rate of human capital δ, the income elasticity
13Of course when mapping the dispersion of accepted hourly wages onto the dispersion of the job oﬀer
distribution F, we take into account that in the model hourly wages are given by w = ωHαhθ−1, so are
function of the type of job, the worker’s human capital and his endogenous choice on hours.
14In practice the observed dispersion in re-employment wages is also partly due to worker speciﬁc ﬁxed
eﬀects. In Section 7 we analyze how results get modiﬁed when allowing workers to diﬀer because of a
ﬁxed eﬀect in productivity that aﬀects wage inequality. We ﬁnd that results are little aﬀected.
18to human capital α, the income elasticity to hours θ and the rate of skill augmenting
technological progress µ. Under log preferences, we can normalize a such that the average
human capital in the economy equals one. To identify δ we rely on information about the
loss of human capital during unemployment. We target the relationship between wage
losses upon reemployment and the duration of the previous unemployment spell. With a
positive δ, a longer duration of unemployment implies lower human capital, which causes
lower reemployment wages because the eﬃciency units of labor and the reservation wage
rate ωr are both smaller. Addison and Portugal (1989) reports an elasticity of reem-
ployment wages losses to unemployment duration between 6% and 10%. We ﬁnd similar
ﬁgures when we run a regression of re-employment wages on unemployment duration in
our PSID sample. We use our simulated data to regress logged reemployment wage losses
(deﬁned as the logged diﬀerence between the hourly wage in the last job before entering
unemployment and the re-employment wage) on the log duration of the unemployment
spell:
logwage losses = cons. + ϕ2 logduration
and we estimate δ by indirect inference to match a value of ϕ2 equal to 0.08.15
To determine α and θ we remember that hourly wages are given by w = ωHαhθ−1.
For individuals who do not change job and do not experience unemployment spells we
can express the within job wage increase as
∆lnwi,t = α∆lnHi,t − (1 − θ)∆lnhi,t. (9)
After constructing a measure for the stock of human capital, this equation allows to
identify α and θ. We set a value for the depreciation rate of human capital and we use the
human capital accumulation equation to construct a synthetic measure of the individual
stock of human capital. Then we regress,
∆lnwi,t = cons. + ϕ3∆lnHi,t + ϕ4∆lnhi,t + ε (10)
on the sample of workers who remain in the same job for two consecutive years. Given
equation (9), we then set α = ϕ3 and θ = ϕ4 + 1 as an approximation.16 Since again we
15Interestingly the resulting estimate of δ is very similar to the depreciation rate of human capital
estimated by Imai and Keane (2004), using a diﬀerent identiﬁcation strategy.
16The mapping between the model parameters and the estimated coeﬃcients would be exact if we could
perfectly measure the stock of human capital and if the data were at the monthly frequency as in the
model. Alternatively we could estimate α and θ by indirect inference. We could simulate data from the
model, aggregate the data at the annual frequency, construct an analogous synthetic measures of human
capital in the simulated data, then run the same regression as in the actual data and ﬁnally search for the
19need yearly observations, we run the regression with data only up to 1997. Table 6 reports
the estimates with PSID data when the synthetic stock of human capital is constructed
using diﬀerent values for the corresponding monthly depreciation rate of human capital.
The results suggest a value of α around 0.04 and one for θ around 0.3 in the 70’s.
Table 6: Determination of α and θ, PSID
Depreciation rate: δ = .01 δ = .013 δ = .016 δ = .02
∆lnH .051 .054 .055 0.058
(4.6) (4.9) (5.5) (5.3)
∆lnh -.68 -.68 -.68 -.68
(-94.7) (-94.7) (-94.7) (-94.7)
Time evolution
∆lnH70−80 .039 .040 .041 .042
(1.9) (2.0) (1.9) (1.9)
∆lnH81−90 .044 .046 .048 .05
(2.9) (3.0) (3.2) (3.2)
∆lnH91−00 .071 .075 .080 .081
(4.1) (4.2) (4.1) (4.4)
n 16,019 16,019 16,019 16,019
Test:
ϕ3,70−80 = ϕ3,81−90 .81 .82 .82 .80
ϕ3,81−90 = ϕ3,91−00 .18 .19 .17 .10
Notes: OLS estimates. t-statistics in parentheses. All regressions include year and
education dummies and potential experience (in levels and squared). The dependant
variable is the within job real wage growth of workers. When characterizing the time
evolution of the coeﬃcient on ∆lnH (coeﬃcient ϕ3 in equation 10) education and
experience are interacted with time dummies to allow their return to change over time.
The last two rows test for possible time changes in ϕ3.
The parameter µ is set to replicate the downward trend in hours worked per male
worker over the period 1950-1970. McGrattan and Rogerson (2004) use US Census data
and report that the average weekly hours worked per prime age male worker has fallen
from around 45 hours to 43.5 hours over the 1950-1970 period. This implies a fall of
pair of α and θ that make the estimated coeﬃcients using model generated data equal to those obtained
in the PSID data. We avoid presenting the result with this strategy just for simplicity. The estimated
α and θ under this alternative strategy would be very similar to those in the baseline speciﬁcation; in
particular, we ﬁnd that when we run the regression (10) with model simulated data the coeﬃcient ϕ3 is
4.2 percent while ϕ4 is minus 68.4 percent, see row 9 and 10 in Table 2.
20around 3.3 percentage points over a twenty period, which suggests setting µ = 0.01485%
at the monthly frequency.
Preferences. There are three preference parameters: the discount factor, β, the relative
weight of leisure in the utility function, λ, and the elasticity of the marginal disutility of
hours, η. To economize on computing time, we set β to 0.99. The value of λ is chosen so
that the average fraction of time spent at work when employed is 0.4. This is the value
we ﬁnd in our PSID sample after dividing Weekly hours (that in the 70’s were around
44.8) by total non-sleeping weekly hours (approximately equal to 16 hours a day times
7 days a week).17 Finally we set η equal to 2. In a competitive labor market without
human capital accumulation, this would imply a Frisch elasticity of labor supply equal to
0.5, which is reasonably in line with standard microeconomic estimates; see Section 7.4
for further discussion on this issue. Moreover with our choice for η, the model generates
a correlation between annual hourly wages and annual hours of work (both in logs) of
minus 12 percent. This is very similar to the value found in the data in the 70’s.18 So
in principle one could also argue that η is set to match the cross sectional correlation
between annual hours and annual hourly wages of the 70’s.
4.3 The US in the 00’s
In the US the unemployment rate has changed little (see Table 1) while wage inequality
has increased substantially. Table 5 documents an increase in the standard deviation of
re-employment wages from around 0.50 in the 70’s to around 0.70 in the 00’s. Moreover,
when we estimate equation (10) allowing for a time-changing eﬀect of human capital on
productivity, we ﬁnd evidence of an increase in α from 0.04 to 0.075, see column 2 in Table
6. This gives a second target to characterize the US in 2000.19 We ﬁnd that with the new
value of α, ν has to increase up to 0.67 in order to match the observed increase of 0.20
points in the standard deviation of re-employment wages, see Table 7. The increase in the
dispersion of job oﬀers slightly decreases the average acceptance rate in the economy, and
so as a result the employment rate in the US00 economy is 0.3 percent lower than in the
US70 economy. This slight fall in the employment rate is consistent with the 1 percent
17Notice that the number for weekly hours is slightly higher than the value reported by McGrattan
and Rogerson (2004).
18For example, in our sample the analogous correlation is around minus 15 percent while Heathcote,
Storesletten, and Violante (2004), on a PSID sample slightly diﬀerent from ours, report a value between
minus 15 and 11 percent over the 70’s.
19Violante (2002) ﬁnds that wages grow faster on the job in the 80’s and in the 90’s than in the 70’s,
which again may be due to an increase in α.
21fall in the employment rate of male workers documented in Table 1.
Table 7: Changes in parameters
Parameter US70 US00 EU00
α 0.040 0.075 0.040
ν 0.348 0.669 0.348
¯ pe 0.212 0.212 0.102
¯ pu 0.279 0.279 0.135
Notes: Parameters whose value changes in either the US00 or the EU00 economy. The
other parameter values are as in Table 3.
4.4 Europe in the 00’s
In Europe the unemployment rate has increased substantially (see Table 1) while wage
inequality has changed little.20 It is also well known that the rise in the EU unemployment
rate is mainly due to a fall in the exit rate from unemployment, while the job separation
rate has remained roughly constant, see for example OECD (1997, chap. 5) and Bean
(1994). To model the increase in unemployment in the EU, we assume that labor market
tightness determines the arrival rate of job oﬀers ¯ pe and ¯ pu and that the relative eﬀec-
tiveness of search on the job and during unemployment has remained unchanged. We
then target a fall in labor market tightness that yields a seven percent fall in the EU
employment rate, which is in line with the evidence in Table 1. Parameter changes are
reported in Table 7. The resulting EU00 economy exhibits a slight fall in the dispersion
of hourly wages upon reemployment, which decreases to 0.46.21 The job-to-job transition
probability also falls slightly from 2.8 percent to 2.2 percent. This is consistent with the
evidence in Winkelmann and Zimmermann (1998) who document that the average num-
ber of job changes experienced by German male workers has fallen in the 90’s relative to
the 70’s.
5 Results
To discuss our quantitative results, we ﬁrst focus on how average hours per worker change
in the US00 and in the EU00 economy. Then we turn to the analysis of other features of
20Indeed, the evidence from the GSOEP conﬁrms that inequality has changed little in Europe. For
example Table 5 shows no evidence of a change in the dispersion of reemployment wages. Moreover, when
we estimated equation (10) on German data and we allowed for a time varying eﬀects of human capital
on productivity, we did not ﬁnd any evidence of a change in α.
21This number may be consistent with the ﬁndings of Table 5, which documents that since the mid
80’s the dispersion of start-up wages in Germany has been roughly constant at the value of 0.43.
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(b) US 1970 vs EU 2000
US70,  50
EU00,  50
Notes: The ﬁgure characterizes the policy function of (detrended) hours worked, b h, as a function of relative
human capital H − ¯ H at ω equal to one, which corresponds to the median of the wage oﬀer distribution. The
solid line corresponds to the US70 economy, the dotted line in panel (a) and (b) to the US00 and the EU00
economy, respectively.
the cross-sectional distribution of hours per worker.
5.1 Average eﬀects
Figure 3 shows how the policy function for detrended hours changes in the US and Europe
in the 00’s relative to the 70’s. The policy function shifts upward in the US (see panel a)
and downward in Europe (see panel b). Changes are comparatively smaller for workers
with greater than average human capital, since for these workers hours decisions are
mainly driven by the intratemporal return.
The overall eﬀect of the changes in the labor market conditions is that the average
number of detrended hours worked per worker increases by 8.5 percent in the US while
it falls by 8.7 percent in Europe, see column 2 in Table 8. This implies that the US-
EU diﬀerential in hours per worker increases by 17.2 per cent in the 00’s relative to the
70’s. This ﬁgure is consistent with the observed diﬀerential evolution of hours per worker
between the US and Europe, although it over predicts slightly the observed change in
average hours for the male population (see Table 1). Our calibration for the trend in
hours per worker µ implies that over a thirty years period the secular decline in hours is
around 5.25 percent. As a result, the model predicts an increase in the level of hours per
worker by 3.25 per cent in the US and a fall by 14 percent in Europe. This is in line with
the empirical ﬁndings for male workers in the US reported in Table 1 and slightly larger
than the 11 percent fall in Germany and the 10 percent fall in France.
We now analyze how each parameter change contributes to the results. First we
23Table 8: Changes in detrended hours worked per worker
Economy Average hours Diﬀ to (1) US-EU diﬀ
×10−2 (%) (%)
(1) US in 1970 40.0 - -
Benchmark model, S (H,G)
(2) US in 2000 43.3 8.5 -
(3) EU in 2000 36.5 -8.7 17.2
Fixed G, S (H,G70)
(4) US in 2000 41.8 4.6 -
(5) EU in 2000 37.3 -6.7 11.3
analyze the contribution of changes in the productivity elasticity to human capital, α,
relative to changes in within skill wage inequality, ν, in driving the results for the US. To
do so we change only α or only ν (as in Table 7) and we compare the obtained results to
those arising in the US00 economy. Row 3 in Table 9 shows that the increase in α induces
an increase in detrended hours per worker of just 1.3 per cent. This amounts to just 15
percent of the overall increase in detrended hours in the US00 economy. The increase in
ν instead yields an increase of 7.6 percent in hours per worker, which accounts for almost
90 percent of the overall increase in hours per worker in the US economy (see row 4). This
suggests that within skill wage inequality plays a major role in explaining the diverging
evolution of hours per worker in the US relative to the EU. When we perform a similar
exercise for the EU to disentangle the relative contribution of changes in ¯ pe and ¯ pu, we ﬁnd
that the change in the arrival rate of job oﬀers while employed, ¯ pe, accounts for around
70 per cent of the EU fall in detrended hours per worker (see row 6). Since a fall in ¯ pe
discourages workers from working longer hours mainly because it makes more diﬃcult
to obtain high-wage jobs, this result again evidences the importance of within-skill wage
inequality for working hours decisions.
In the model, parameter changes aﬀect aggregate hours per worker both directly,
through their eﬀects on policy functions, and indirectly, through the eﬀects that changes in
the equilibrium distribution of human capital exert on workers ability to obtain job oﬀers.
To analyze the contribution of this equilibrium eﬀect, we perform our numerical exercises
for the US00 and the EU00 economies assuming that the function that characterizes
search eﬃciency in the 70’s remains unchanged in the 00’s—so that search eﬃciency units
in the 00’s are given by S (H,G70), where G70 denotes the distribution of human capital
in the 70’s. Parameter changes are again obtained to match the statistics discussed in
24Table 9: Decomposition of the diﬀerential
Economy Average hours Diﬀ to (1) Relative change
×10−2 (%) (%)
(1) US70 40.0 - -
(2) US00 43.3 8.5 -4.4
(3) ∆α 40.4 1.3 15.0
(4) ∆ν 43.0 7.7 89.9
(5) EU00 36.5 -8.7 19.1
(6) ∆¯ pe 37.5 -6.1 69.9
(7) ∆¯ pu 39.6 -0.9 10.4
Section 4.3 and 4.4. We ﬁnd that, in the absence of equilibrium eﬀects, detrended hours
increase by 4.6 percent in the US, while they fall by 6.7 percent in Europe, see rows 4
and 5 in Table 8. This implies an increase of 11.3 percent in the US-EU diﬀerential which
amounts to about 2/3 of the overall increase generated by the model. Thus, accounting
for the eﬀects of a changing distribution of workers’ human capital on job competition
ampliﬁes the eﬀects of parameter changes. This multiplier eﬀect arises because, when
aggregate average human capital increases, workers work longer hours to catch up with
other workers in order to obtain job oﬀers.
5.2 The distribution of hours worked
So far we have analyzed changes in average hours per worker. This focus however masks
interesting eﬀects on the shape of the distribution of hours per worker in the economy,
which provide further testable implication for the model. Figure 4 characterizes the
density function of log hourly wages, detrended hours and human capital in the baseline
economy of the 70’s (as a solid line) and in the relevant economy of the 00’s (as a dotted
line). The column on the left deals with the US, that on the right with Europe. Density
functions are calculated using a Gaussian Kernel where the bandwidth is chosen using
the optimal rule proposed by Silverman (1986). As expected from the calibration, wage
inequality increases substantially in the US while it changes little in Europe. Also the
distribution of detrended hours (and thereby of human capital) shifts to the right in the
US and to the left in Europe.22
22The shifts of the distribution of human capital could make labor productivity higher in the US than in
Europe. This eﬀect is however very small given the low calibrated value of α. Actually labor productivity
per hour worked falls in the US since hours increase and income increases less than linearly with hours,
25Regarding the fraction of workers putting very long hours, Kuhn and Lozano (2005)
use data from the Current Population Survey for the US and document that, over the
last three decades, the fraction of prime age male employees working more than 50 hours
per week has increased sharply, between ﬁve and eight percentage points, depending on
the data used and the sample of workers considered. This change has reversed a secular
trend of decline in the fraction of men working long hours. In our model the fraction
of US workers working more than 50 hours per week—that corresponds to a value for
detrended hours of 0.4 · 50/44.8 in the 70’s and to 0.4 · 50 · 1.053/44.8 in the 00’s—goes
from 7 percent to 15 percent, which implies an increase similar to the one observed in the
data.23
Another notable feature in the distribution of hours per worker is the emergence in
the 00’s of a substantial mass of discouraged European workers, who work slightly less
than 30 hours per week. This group of workers correspond to the smaller peak in the
distribution of hours that emerge in the 00’s in Europe, see the dotted line in the panel in
the second row and second column of Figure 4.24 These are workers who have experienced
a long unemployment spell, and who enter employment with a human capital level that
is signiﬁcantly lower than the average in the population. These workers feel discouraged
from working longer hours because marginal increases in human capital improve little
their productivity ranking among workers in the economy, which implies that human
capital has small eﬀects on the job oﬀer probability at the margin. Interestingly OECD
(1998, chap. 5) and OECD (2004, chap. 1) also report that, over the 1985-2002 period,
Continental European countries have experienced a sharp increase in the fraction of male
workers working very few hours (say working less than 30 or 20 hours per week).
θ < 1.
23If we do not allow for some measurement error in the simulated data, the model appears to generate
too few workers working more than 50 hours per week relative to the data. Kuhn and Lozano (2005)
focus the analysis on male workers aged between 25 and 64 years and report a value of around 15 percent
for the fraction in the 70’s. When we use the CPS March ﬁle and we consider the sample of full time
(more than 30 hours per week) male workers aged between 25 and 55 years old we ﬁnd that in the 70’s the
fraction of workers working more than 50 hours is around 23 per cent. This is also the value generated by
the model when we consider the possibility of adding measurement error to the data on hours generated
by the model, which, according to French (2002), has a variance of 0.0167. With measurement error the
fraction of workers working long hours then increase up to 29 percent in the US00 economy.
24Notice that, due to an increase in the dispersion of the distribution of human capital, a small group
of discouraged workers also emerge in the US00 economy; see the dotted line in the ﬁrst column and
second row panel of Figure 4.
26Figure 4: Distributions: US 1970 vs US 2000 and vs EU 2000
























Notes: Solid line corresponds to the density function in the US 70’s economy of the logged hourly wage (ﬁrst
row), monthly hours worked for employed workers (second row) and human capital (third row). The dotted line
in panel (a) and (b) corresponds to the density function in the US 2000 and EU 2000 economy, respectively.
Density functions are calculated using a Gaussian Kernel where the bandwidth is chosen using the optimal rule
proposed by Silverman (1986).
276 Further testable implications
We now discuss some implications of the theory for the the evolution of the intertemporal
return to hours worked as measured by Bell and Freeman (2001) and for the proﬁle of
hours for workers at diﬀerent stages of their career.
6.1 The intertemporal return
Bell and Freeman (2001) have proposed to estimate the eﬀects of past hours worked on
wages by estimating the following equation:
lnwi,t = cons. + ϕ5 lnwi,t−1 + ϕ6 lnhi,t + ϕ7 lnhi,t−1 + εi,t (11)
where i refers to worker and t to time, wi,t and hi,t denote hourly wages and hours of
work, respectively. The appendix shows how this equation can be derived in the context
of the two period model of Section 2. The coeﬃcient ϕ5 captures the serial correlation
in wages due to the serial correlation in the job type (i.e. due to ω in the model). The
coeﬃcient ϕ6 measures the eﬀect of current hours on current wages, which tends to be
negative if labor income increases less than linearly with hours (θ < 1 in the model).
The coeﬃcient ϕ7 measures the eﬀect of past hours on current wages. A positive ϕ7
indicates that hours worked increase future wages. We estimate the Bell and Freeman
equation by OLS and by allowing for a ﬁxed eﬀect. This is because the error term in (18)
could contain an unobserved individual ﬁxed eﬀect term, which may be correlated with
labor income and hours. Fixed eﬀects estimates are based on the two-step Arellano and
Bond (1991) estimator (diﬀerence GMM estimator). The instruments are lagged values
of past ﬁve years averages. Standard errors are corrected for ﬁnite sample bias as in
Windmeijer (2005). As in Bell and Freeman (2001), hours and wages are measured as
ﬁve year averages to remove business cycle eﬀects. In the regressions we also control for
education and experience. These controls have no counterpart in our simple model, but
are regarded as important in the empirical literature. We present evidence for both the
US and Germany.
The eﬀect of current hours on future income should have increased in the US while
they should have changed little in Europe. This is because the return to skill and within-
skill wage inequality have increased sharply in the US while they have hardly changed in
Europe. The appendix shows how this result can be formally derived in the context of
the two period model of Section 2. To check this, we estimate equation (11) but allowing
for a time-changing coeﬃcient ϕ7. We allow the coeﬃcient to change every ﬁve years.
28Since several authors have argued that in the US the return to education and experience
have increased over time, we have also interacted education and experience with time
dummies. This allows the return to experience and education to change over time. The
results are presented in Table 10. Panel (a) deals with the PSID and panel (b) with the
GSOEP. We present results both with yearly and weekly hours. In columns [1] we report
the OLS estimates, in columns [2] the ﬁxed eﬀects estimates. As expected the coeﬃcient
Table 10: Evolution of the intertemporal return
(a) PSID (b) GSOEP
Annual Usual weekly Annual Usual weekly
[1] [2] [1] [2] [1] [2] [1] [2]
ϕ5 0.81 0.48 0.81 0.43 ϕ5 0.65 0.15 0.67 0.09
(192.4) (3.57) (189.2) (2.7) (73.76) (2.0) (73.8) (1.4)
ϕ6 -0.43 -0.56 -0.35 -0.56 ϕ6 -0.63 -1.05 -0.64 -1.03
(-41.4) (-10.5) (-34.2) (-10.1) (-24.7) (-11.0) (-24.2) (-10.2)
ϕ7,70−75 0.43 0.41 0.44 0.58
(15.7) (4.9) (12.8) (4.6)
ϕ7,76−80 0.47 0.41 0.47 0.58
(21.0) (5.3) (16.5) (4.7)
ϕ7,81−85 0.46 0.40 0.42 0.56
(22.1) (5.1) (14.8) (4.5)
ϕ7,86−90 0.51 0.41 0.49 0.56 ϕ7,84−88 0.53 0.27 0.57 0.30
(28.0) (5.4) (20.1) (4.4) (13.0) (3.1) (14.0) (2.5)
ϕ7,91−95 0.58 0.50 0.61 0.67 ϕ7,89−93 0.60 0.27 0.71 0.30
(29.1) (5.8) (24.3) (4.7) (19.1) (2.8) (19.6) (2.0)
ϕ7,96−00 0.60 0.51 0.59 0.64 ϕ7,94−98 0.57 0.22 0.56 0.26
(13.3) (5.5) (10.1) (4.6) (15.3) (2.9) (14.3) (2.0)
Test: Test:
ϕ7,70’s = ϕ7,80’s .17 .39 .50 .50
ϕ7,70’s = ϕ7,90’s .00 .07 .00 .09 ϕ7,80’s =
ϕ7,80’s = ϕ7,90’s .00 .00 .00 .03 ϕ7,90’s .63 .09 .17 0.10
Notes: Panel (a) deals with PSID, Panel (b) with GSOEP. The ﬁrst two columns in each panel use total annual hours in all
jobs whereas the second two columns use usual weekly hours worked in main job. In column [1] OLS estimates, in column
[2] ﬁxed eﬀects estimates. Fixed eﬀects estimates are based on the two steps Arellano and Bond (1991) estimator (diﬀerence
GMM estimator). Standard errors are corrected for ﬁnite sample bias as in Windmeijer (2005). t-statistics in parentheses.
The dependent variable is the logged real hourly wage. Hours and wages are measured as ﬁve years averages. Instruments
are lagged values of past ﬁve years averages. All regressions include year and education dummies and potential experience
(in levels and squared) and allow for a time varying return to education and experience. The last rows test for possible
time changes in the coeﬃcient ϕ7 in regression (11).
ϕ5 is positive and ϕ6 is negative.25 We also ﬁnd that the coeﬃcient ϕ7, that measures the
intertemporal return, is positive and statistically signiﬁcant. This is true for both the US
and Germany and independently of whether we consider yearly or weekly hours. When
25ϕ6 is slightly greater in absolute value in Germany than in the US. This may be because in Germany
many jobs current income is inﬂuenced by collective agreements, and it is set independently of the number
of hours worked in the period. So workers can raise their labor income only by either obtaining better
jobs or getting promoted in the current one. Thus hourly wages in the current job decrease faster in
Germany than in the US when current hours increase.
29considering the estimates based on the two-step Arellano-Bond estimator (see the columns
labeled as [2]), the serial correlation of wages as measured by ϕ5 falls signiﬁcantly relative
to the OLS estimates. But the estimated ϕ7 is again positive, statistically signiﬁcant and
of a very similar magnitude.
For the US, we ﬁnd that ϕ7 has increased over time. A formal statistical test shows
that the intertemporal returns to hours worked are larger in the 90’s than in the 80’s and
in the 70’s.26 In Germany, instead the intertemporal return falls in the 90’s relative to
the 80’s, although the diﬀerence is not statistically signiﬁcative.
To evaluate the model performance, we now analyze the model’s ability to reproduce
the sign, magnitude, and time evolution of the estimated coeﬃcients of equation (11). We
simulate data for 10.000 individuals for 10 years from the US70, the US00 and the EU00
economy. We then pool together the data from the US70 and from either the US00 or
the EU00 economy, we construct ﬁve year averages of individual yearly wages and yearly
hours worked exactly as in the PSID (and the GSOEP) and we run equation (11) on model
simulated data. To analyze the evolution of the intertemporal return in the model we
allow the eﬀect of past hours on current wage (i.e. the analogue of ϕ7 in equation 11) to
change in the 00’s relative to the 70’s, exactly as in Table 10. We also consider the eﬀects
of introducing measurement error in the model generated data, which several authors
have argued to be substantial in PSID data. We base our correction for measurement
error on the ﬁndings by French (2002) who uses the PSID Validation Study to argue that
the variance of the measurement error in wages to be .0207 and that in hours to be .0167.
Notice that at no point of the calibration we imposed that the model should match the
size and magnitude of the regression coeﬃcients estimated with the PSID or the GSOEP
data.
When we consider the US70 and US00 economies without and with measurement
error, and we ran the regression analogous to (11) after allowing for a time-changing
intertemporal return we ﬁnd that
USNM: lnwi,t = cons. + 0.44lnwi,t−1 − 0.98lnhi,t + 0.65 lnhi,t−1|70’s + 0.95 lnhi,t−1|00’s
USYM: lnwi,t = cons. + 0.42lnwi,t−1 − 0.60lnhi,t + 0.29 lnhi,t−1|70’s + 0.52 lnhi,t−1|00’s
where the subindex “NM” and “YM” stand for the result from the model simulated data
without or with measurement error, respectively. The last two coeﬃcients in each equation
characterize the value of the coeﬃcient ϕ7 in equation (11) in the 70’s and in the 00’s,
26Notice that the result is not driven by the change in the sampling frequency of the PSID: the estimated
ϕ7’s using data on the 85-95 period and the 90-00 period are indeed very similar, see Table 10.
30respectively. When instead we consider the US70 and the EU00 economy we obtain that
EUNM: lnwi,t = cons. + 0.42lnwi,t−1 − 0.31lnhi,t + 0.33 lnhi,t−1|70’s + 0.29 lnhi,t−1|00’s
EUYM: lnwi,t = cons. + 0.40lnwi,t−1 − 0.25lnhi,t + 0.21 lnhi,t−1|70’s + 0.20 lnhi,t−1|00’s
where again the subindex identiﬁes whether simulated data also contain measurement
error. Overall the model reproduces reasonably well key features of the estimation of
equation (11), as reported in Table 10. The match is more accurate when we allow for
some measurement error in the simulated data and we focus on the empirical results based
on the Arellano-Bond estimator that was used to correct for the possible presence in the
data of individual ﬁxed eﬀects, not present in the model. In particular the model matches
quite accurately the magnitude and time evolution of the coeﬃcient ϕ7, that characterizes
the intertemporal return, which increases in the US while it falls slightly in Europe. Also
the coeﬃcient ϕ6 that measures how current hours are related to current hourly wages is in
line with the data.27 Only the coeﬃcient ϕ5 that measures the serial correlation of wages
is lower in the model than in the data. The diﬀerence however completely disappears
when purging the data from the presence of individual ﬁxed eﬀects.
6.2 Hours and age
In the model increasing human capital gives easier access to better jobs. This eﬀect is
captured by the semi-elasticity of the probability of getting oﬀers with respect to human
capital, which reaches its maximum at the average human capital in the population while
it converges to zero for human capital levels at either tail of the human capital distribution.
This means that for workers who have worked either many hours or just a few, the return
to working longer hours is mainly intratemporal. As clearly shown in Figure 3, this implies
that their working time decisions are little aﬀected by changes in aggregate labor market
conditions. More generally, in a life cycle economy where individuals are born with a
relatively low human capital level that they progressively accumulate as they participate
in the labor market, the intertemporal return to working time is small for young workers
and almost nil for workers at late stages of the working career. Thus the model generally
predicts that changes in aggregate labor market conditions should have maximal eﬀects
27This coeﬃcient captures the correlation between current wages and current hours. Heathcote,
Storesletten, and Violante (2004) have argued that the correlation between hourly wages and yearly
hours have changed over time: it was around minus 0.12 at the beginning of the 70’s, it then increased
up to 0.02 in the mid 80’s and then dropped again to minus 0.11 in 1996. In our model the correlation
between annual wages and yearly hours is equal to minus 0.15 in the 70’s and minus 0.10 in the US00
economy, which appears to be in line with the PSID data.
31on working hours at mid career. The eﬀects on end-career workers should instead be small
and any observed change is most likely due to factors other than those emphasized in the
paper. 28
To study these implications of the model in the data, Figure 5 characterizes the age
proﬁle of weekly hours per worker in the male only population. To compare results with
McGrattan and Rogerson (2004), we consider four age groups (25-34, 35-44, 45-54 and
55-64 years old). Panels (a) and (b) characterize US workers in 1970 and in 2000, whereas
panels (c) and (d) compare Germany to the US in 2000. The data in each panel are scaled
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Notes: All data refer to the men only population. Hours per worker are measured by the number of hours
usually worked per week. Data are scaled by the level of hours per worker of the youngest age group in 2000 in
the US, which are 44.5 in the Census and 45.6 in the PSID. Panel (a) plots hours per worker as a function of age
by using data from the US Census in 1970 (dotted line) and in 2000 (solid line). The statistics are calculated
by McGrattan and Rogerson (2004). Panel (b) uses data from the PSID. Panel (c) compares hours per worker
in the US Census in 2000 (solid line) with hours per worker in Germany in the same year using the GSOEP
(dotted line). Panel (d) is analogous to panel (c) but the US data come from the PSID.
by the level of hours per worker of the youngest age group in 2000 in the US data set
28The eﬀects on young workers are instead more ambiguous. On the one hand they have more time to
capitalize any investment in human capital, which increases the intertemporal return. On the other hand
they have low human capital, which reduces the semi-elasticity of the job oﬀer probability and thereby
the intertemporal return.
32considered in the graph—which corresponds to 44.5 hours per week in the US Census and
to 45.6 in our PSID sample. Panel (a) uses data from the US Census in 1970 (plotted as
a dotted line) and in 2000 (as a solid line). The statistics are calculated by McGrattan
and Rogerson (2004). Panel (b) is analogous to panel (a) when using data from the PSID
rather than from the Census. In each sample the age proﬁle of hours is hump-shaped and
end-career workers work fewest hours. Panels (a) and (b) also indicate that the increase
in hours per worker in the US has been most pronounced for mid-career workers. In the
US Census, the percentage increase in hours per worker at mid career has been about
ﬁve percent, while the increase for end-career workers has been about 2 percent. In our
PSID sample, end-career workers are working approximately the same amount of hours in
the 1970 as in the 2000, while mid-career workers are currently working about 2 percent
more hours per week than they used to do in the 1970. These diﬀerential eﬀects are
further evidence consistent with the idea that the intertemporal return to hours worked
has increased in the US.
Panel (c) compares the age proﬁle of hours per worker in the US Census in 2000
(solid line) with the analogous proﬁle as obtained from our GSOEP sample in the same
year (dotted line). Panel (d) is analogous to Panel (c) but the US data come from the
PSID rather than from the Census. The ﬁgure shows that diﬀerences in hours per worker
in the US and in Germany are generally small for male workers at late stages of their
working career. Diﬀerences are instead more pronounced for mid-career workers, who
today appear to work about 5 percent fewer hours per week in Germany than in the US.
This is consistent with the idea that the intertemporal incentives to work longer hours
are greater in the US than in Germany.
7 Robustness exercises
We analyze how the quantitative results change (i) when introducing worker speciﬁc ﬁxed
heterogeneity in the model, (ii) when changing the value of the parameter γ that charac-
terizes the sensitivity of the job oﬀer probability to human capital, (iii) when considering
an alternative speciﬁcation for the function ψ that characterizes the eﬀects of workers
competition for jobs, and (iv) when changing the elasticity of the marginal disutility of
working η. Overall these exercises conﬁrm that labor market conditions (in terms of
wage inequality and unemployment) can quantitatively explain the observed diﬀerences
in hours per worker between the US and the EU. In all extensions the parameters of the
economy in the 70’s are calibrated again to minimize the diﬀerence with the targets in
Table 2, while the identiﬁcation of the parameter changes in the 00’s follows the same
33strategy as in Sections 4.3 and 4.4. The only exception is the depreciation of human
capital δ, which we leave as in the benchmark economy.29 The resulting parameter values
for the economies in the 70’s and in the 00’s appear in Table 3 and 11, respectively.
Table 11: Changes in parameters, extensions
Fixed heterogeneity Lower γ Mode Greater η
US70 US00 EU00 US70 US00 EU00 US70 US00 EU00 US70 US00 EU00
α 0.040 0.075 0.040 0.040 0.075 0.040 0.040 0.075 0.040 0.040 0.075 0.040
ν 0.162 0.317 0.162 0.370 0.708 0.370 0.334 0.629 0.334 0.334 0.654 0.334
¯ pe 0.202 0.202 0.092 0.217 0.217 0.114 0.221 0.221 0.164 0.203 0.203 0.094
¯ pu 0.288 0.288 0.132 0.261 0.261 0.137 0.230 0.230 0.219 0.303 0.303 0.141
σ2
υ 0.117 0.228 0.117 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Notes: Parameters whose value changes in either the US00 or the EU00 economy. The other parameter values are as in
Table 3.
7.1 Worker speciﬁc ﬁxed heterogeneity
Using as a target wage inequality and neglecting worker speciﬁc ﬁxed heterogeneity can
lead to a too high estimate of the variance of the wage oﬀer distribution as well as of
its increase in the US. This may aﬀect the quantitative results of the model. To analyze
this issue, we now extend the model by assuming that a worker produces income υωHαhα
when employed, and obtains utility logυ+b when unemployed, where υ is a worker’s ﬁxed
eﬀect in production. We assume that ﬁxed eﬀects are symmetrically distributed around
their mean with variance σ2
υ. As in Conesa and Krueger (2006), we assume for simplicity
that the distribution of ﬁxed eﬀects is characterized by two mass points. Following Moﬃtt
and Gottschalk (2002), we target the autocorrelation of annual hourly wages at a ﬁve-year
time horizon and we estimate the value of σ2
υ in the US70 economy by indirect inference.
The idea is that workers speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects play a predominant role in determining the
autocorrelation of wages at a suﬃciently long time horizon. In our PSID sample the ﬁve-
year autocorrelation of hourly wages is around 0.6 during the 70’s, which is in line with
the ﬁnding by Moﬃtt and Gottschalk (2002). In characterizing the US economy in the
00’s, we take into account that part of the observed increase in within-skill wage inequality
may be due to ﬁxed heterogeneity. To identify the increase in the variance of ﬁxed eﬀects
we target the ﬁve-year autocorrelation of wages in the 00’s, which we ﬁnd unchanged
29We are comfortable with this strategy since our estimate for δ is very similar to the analogous estimate
by Imai and Keane (2004). Searching for the value of δ that minimizes the distance with the targets in
Table 2 would instead involve substantial computational costs, especially because changing δ would also
demand for a new estimate of α and θ, see Table 6.
34relative to the the 70’s.30 Moreover, as in the baseline speciﬁcation, we characterize the
US00 economy by changing α as implied by Table 6 and by targeting the increase in the
dispersion of reemployment wages. The EU00 economy is instead characterized using the
same targets as in the benchmark case.
The value of (detrended) average hours per worker in the US70, US00 and EU00
economy appears in Table 12. The US-EU diﬀerential in hours increases by 17.2 percent,
exactly as in the baseline speciﬁcation, see Table 8. The quantitative eﬀects remain
unchanged because the percentage increase in the dispersion of the wage oﬀer distribution
is almost as in the baseline economy. As it is apparent from equation (4) for the two
period model, relative rather than absolute changes in the dispersion of the wage oﬀer
distribution determine the magnitude of the percentage changes in hours per worker.
Table 12: Changes in detrended hours per worker, extensions
Economy Average hours Diﬀ to (1) US-EU diﬀ
×10−2 (%) (%)
Fixed heterogeneity
(1) US in 1970 40.0 - -
(2) US in 2000 43.2 9.1 -
(3) EU in 2000 36.3 -8.1 17.2
Lower γ
(1) US in 1970 40.0 - -
(2) US in 2000 44.0 10.0 -
(3) EU in 2000 38.0 -5.0 15.0
Mode
(1) US in 1970 40.7 - -
(2) US in 2000 44.0 8.0 -
(3) EU in 2000 37.7 -7.5 15.4
Greater η
(1) US in 1970 39.9 - -
(2) US in 2000 42.4 6.3 -
(3) EU in 2000 36.4 -8.7 15.0
30This is in line with the ﬁndings by Moﬃtt and Gottschalk (2002). A constant autocorrelation implies
that the variance of the wage oﬀer distribution and of the workers ﬁxed eﬀects have increased roughly in
the same proportion.
357.2 Changing γ
In our baseline speciﬁcation we have estimated γ—which characterizes the sensitivity of
the job oﬀer probability to human capital—by indirect inference by matching the eﬀects
of past hours on the probability of a job to job transition. To analyze the robustness of
our results we now reduce the value of γ down to 7.5. The calibration strategy is as in the
benchmark speciﬁcation, with the diﬀerence that now γ is set exogenously. We ﬁnd that
the diﬀerential of hours per worker between the US and Europe increases by 15 percent,
which is slightly lower than the 17 percent increase obtained the benchmark calibration.
The most signiﬁcative change is that with a lower γ we have a somewhat larger increase
of hours per worker in the US and a smaller fall in hours in the Europe (see Table 12).
7.3 Changing ψ
We now consider an alternative speciﬁcation for the function ψ that characterizes the
eﬀects of workers competition for jobs. We assume that ψ (G) is equal to the mode
rather than to the average of the distribution of human capital in the economy. This
is a reasonable alternative speciﬁcation for the function that characterizes the eﬀects
of the human capital distribution on the job oﬀer probability since the human capital
distribution is arguably more concentrated around its mode that around its mean. So
ranking models should predict that the marginal eﬀect of human capital on the job oﬀer
probability is maximized at the mode rather than at the average of the distribution of
human capital. When considering this alternative speciﬁcation we ﬁnd that the results
change little, see Table 12. This is because in the model the diﬀerence between the mode
and the average is small.
7.4 Changing η
In a competitive labor market without human capital accumulation, the elasticity of the
marginal disutility of working η is equal to the inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labor
supply. In our baseline speciﬁcation we have chosen a value of η equal to two, that would
imply a Frisch elasticity of 0.5. This choice generates a correlation between annual hourly
wages and annual hours that is roughly consistent with the data and it is in line with
some recent microeconomic estimates of the labor supply elasticity for prime age males,
as for example Lee (2001) and Domeij and Flod´ en (2006). Still, the empirical literature
on labor supply of prime age males has traditionally argued in favor of a smaller value
for the Frisch elasticity (a higher η); see for instance Blundell and MaCurdy (1999) and
36the references therein.31 So we now analyze the eﬀects of reducing the Frisch elasticity
(increasing η) by setting η = 3, which would imply a Frisch elasticity equal to 1/3. As
expected, we ﬁnd that the response of hours in the US is smaller than in the benchmark
economy: with a higher η detrended hours increase by 6.3 percent rather than by 8.5
percent as in the benchmark economy, see Table 12. After taking into account the trend
in hours, this implies a total increase in US hours per worker in the 00’s relative to the
70’s of about 1 percent, which is closer to the value in the data. The eﬀects for Europe are
instead roughly unchanged. This is partly because with a higher η, the policy function
for hours becomes ﬂatter, which implies that γ has to increase relative to its value in the
benchmark economy to match the regression coeﬃcient of job-to-job transitions on past
hours, see Table 3. Overall, the model with higher η generates an increase in the US-EU
diﬀerential in hours per worker which is just smaller than the increase obtained in the
benchmark economy.
8 Conclusions
We constructed a labor market search model where, by working longer hours, workers
acquire greater skills and can thereby obtain better jobs. In the model several features
of the labor market can inﬂuence the decision on working time. In particular within-
skill wage inequality gives incentives to work longer hours, while a longer duration of
unemployment, and in general a less tight labor market discourage working time. We used
the model to quantify the contribution of within-skill wage inequality and unemployment
in explaining the diverging evolution of hours per worker in the US and the EU. The
model is estimated by matching a variety of statistics on labor ﬂows and wage dynamics
at the micro level, mainly obtained from the PSID. We ﬁnd that diﬀerences in labor
market conditions can account for the US-EU diﬀerences in hours per worker emerged
over the last 30 years. Our model also predicts an increase both in the fraction of US
workers working very long hours and in the fraction of European workers working few
hours. Both implications ﬁnd empirical support in the data. Theories that focus just on
Europe to explain the widening in the US-EU diﬀerential in hours per worker, may ﬁnd
hard to explain why the fraction of US workers working long hours has increased sharply
31Notice however that it may be misleading to apply standard microeconomic estimates to our model.
As argued by Imai and Keane (2004), standard estimates of the elasticity of the marginal disutility of
hours are upward biased because they do not take into account the eﬀects of working time on human
capital accumulation. And there are reasons to believe that the bias should be even more pronounced
when search frictions are also present. This is because, as discussed in Section 3.3, workers work longer
hours when employed in jobs with lower wage rates, which tends to induce a negative correlation between
hourly wages and hours worked.
37over the last thirty years, after reverting a trend of secular decline. Our quantitative
results show that within-skill wage inequality plays a major role in accounting for this
fact.
We purposely simpliﬁed the theoretical analysis in some dimensions. For example
we have assumed that human capital helps in obtaining job oﬀers, because more skilled
workers are more likely to be preferred when competing against other job applicants. Yet
one may think that human capital also helps in keeping jobs, so that more skilled workers
lose their job less often. When we used the PSID data to see whether past hours are
related to the job separation probability we did not ﬁnd any signiﬁcant evidence for an
eﬀect of past hours on job separation. Moreover the separation rate has changed little over
time both in the US and in Europe despite the observed changes in hours worked. Given
the focus on the US-EU experience, we therefore avoided modeling this eﬀect of human
capital. Of course, the eﬀect could yet be important to understand working time behavior
in some speciﬁc segments of the labor market. We believe this to be an interesting issue
to be investigated in future research.
We have also modeled wage inequality and the job oﬀer probability as exogenous.
This again is a simplifying assumption that we think is justiﬁed on the grounds that
there is yet no consensus on why labor market conditions have evolved diﬀerently in the
US and Europe. The list of suspects is vast and include diﬀerences in the evolution of
taxes, of labor market institutions, of business-creation costs, of ﬁnancial market imper-
fections and of trade liberalization as well as explanations based on the interaction of
some constant-over-time diﬀerences in institutions with some common shocks to either
the pace of technological progress, the level of labor market turbulence or the degree of
opening to trade, see Bean (1994) and Hornstein, Krusell, and Violante (2005) for some
review of this debate. Of course ﬁnding exhaustive explanations for why aggregate hours
worked and wage inequality have evolved diﬀerently across the two sides of the Atlantic
is a priority. In this paper we have just stressed that aggregate labor market conditions
can have an important eﬀect on aggregate hours worked also because of their eﬀect on
hours per worker, which is a novel claim with several interesting implications.
Finally, we have characterized the eﬀects of human capital on job oﬀer probabilities by
making simplifying assumptions intended to capture key properties of ranking models. For
example, we have assumed a speciﬁc functional form and we have estimated its parameters
by looking at the average elasticity of job to job movements to past hours worked. One
could instead estimate a non-parametric relationship between job to job transitions and
human capital so as to recover the shape of the function from data. We have also assumed
that only some speciﬁc moments of the distribution of human capital in the economy aﬀect
38job oﬀer probabilities. It might yet be that also other moments matter. To identify these
eﬀects one should observe some independent variation in the distribution of human capital
across labor markets. For example, one could assume that human capital is occupation-
speciﬁc and then analyze how the distribution of human capital in various occupations
aﬀect job oﬀer probabilities. This would be an interesting extension that would require
however to model carefully the ﬂows of workers within and between occupations.
39A Data appendix
A.1 PSID
We select all male household heads who are in the age group 25-55. We focus on these workers
because they are most likely to actively engage in the labor market; this reduces sample selection
problems related to labor market participation, which is an issue not explicitly analyzed in the
model. We exclude the SEO sample. Data start in 1968 and ends in 2001. The survey is annual
up to 1997 and bi-annual thereafter. We include individuals with at least 3 observations in a 5
year period. Below we describe the variables used in the analysis. Panel A in Table 13 contains
some descriptive statistics for the main sample.
Labor income. Total annual labor income from all jobs. Self-employed income is split between
labor and capital income. In this case only the labor part is added.
Yearly hours. Total annual hours worked for money, from family ﬁles. It refers to all possible
jobs of the worker. It includes overtime.
Weekly hours. Hours usually worked per week in main job, top coded at 98 hours per week.
Tenure. Months with present employer. Since data for the 1968-1974 period are bracketed,
tenure for those years is measured by the mid point of the interval.
Race. Race code for individual, from family ﬁle. In all regressions, we consider three dummies
corresponding to white, black, or others.
Years of education. Highest grade completed, 1-17 classiﬁcation.
Hourly wage. Labor income divided by Yearly Hours. They are expressed in 1992 dollars by
using the GDP deﬂator.
Weeks unemployed. Number of weeks of unemployment over the last year. In 1968 and 1969
this information is bracketed and with only one interval from 6 weeks onwards.
Experience. Measured as age minus six minus years of education.
Job-to-job. An individual experiences a job-to job transition during the year that goes from t
to t+1 if i) he is employed at t, ii) he is employed at t+1, iii) he has experienced less than two
weeks in unemployment over the year, iv) he has a tenure less than 12 months at time t + 1,
and v) tenure at t + 1 is smaller than tenure at t plus six. This last requirement is intended to
correct for measurement error in the tenure measure.
Employment to unemployment. An individual experiences a transition from employment to
unemployment during the year that goes from t to t+1 if i) he is employed at t, ii) he experiences
more than two weeks in unemployment over the year.
A.2 GSOEP
We select all male household heads who are in the age group 25-55. We focus on individuals who
reside in the former Federal Republic of Germany. Data start in 1985 and ends in 2002. Panel
40B of Table 13 contains some descriptive statistics. Following is a description of the variables
used in the analysis.
Labor income. Total annual labor earnings in the previous year. Labor earnings include wage
and salary from all employment. It is the sum of income from primary job, secondary job, self-
employment, 13th month pay, 14th month pay, Christmas bonus pay, holiday bonus pay, mis-
cellaneous bonus pay, and proﬁt sharing income. It is obtained from Cross National-Equivalent
Files.
Yearly hours. Total annual hours worked for money, either as a full-time, part-time or short-time
work. It is obtained from Cross National-Equivalent Files.
Weekly hours. Original variable is “tatzeit”. This is the response to the question: “How many
hours per week do your actual working-hours consist of including possible over-time?” The
question refers to the respondent’s main job.
Tenure. Original variable “erwzeit”. Length of time with current ﬁrm (in years).
Months unemployed Number of months received unemployment beneﬁts or reliefs.
Years of education Number of Years of Education completed at the time of survey. It is obtained
from Cross National-Equivalent Files.
Hourly wage Labor income divided by Yearly Hours. They are expressed in 2001 Marks by using
the CPI index.
Experience Measured as age minus six minus years of education.
Job-to-job An individual experiences a job-to job transition during the year that goes from t
to t + 1 if i) he is employed at t, ii) he is employed at t + 1, iii) he has experienced less than
one month in unemployment over the year, iv) he has a tenure less than one year at time t + 1,
and v) tenure at t + 1 is smaller than tenure at t plus 0.5. This last requirement is intended to
correct for measurement error in the tenure measure.
Employment to unemployment An individual experiences a transition from employment to un-
employment during the year that goes from t to t+1 if i) he is employed at t, ii) he experiences
more than one month in unemployment over the year.
B Computational appendix
We ﬁrst discuss how we solve for the policy functions that characterize the problem of employed
and unemployed workers. Then we discuss how we calculate aggregate statistics in the model
economy and how we solve for the parameter values that match the targets in Table 2.
B.1 Solving for the decision rules
We make the problems in (6) and (7) stationary by using the variable ˆ h = ht(1 + µ)t. Then we
solve the problem by value function iteration as follows:
41Table 13: Descriptive statistics, PSID and GSOEP
A) PSID
Year Mean Wage SD log-Wage Weekly hours Yearly hours Yrs of schooling Experience Tenure
1968 15.2 .53 44.5 2126.6 11.6 22.1 103.7
1969 15.2 .52 45.5 2188.2 11.7 22.0 100.5
1970 15.5 .52 46.2 2224.8 11.9 21.4 99.6
1971 15.6 .51 45.8 2167.9 12.1 21.1 96.5
1972 15.9 .53 45.7 2150.6 12.2 20.7 89.2
1973 15.8 .53 46.0 2192.2 12.4 19.8 86.4
1974 15.9 .51 46.0 2198.5 12.5 19.3 84.3
1975 16.4 .54 46.0 2157.2 12.7 18.9 86.7
1976 15.4 .53 45.8 2115.7 12.7 18.7 91.0
1977 15.9 .54 46.1 2141.9 12.8 18.3 82.1
1978 16.1 .54 46.3 2154.5 12.8 18.0 75.0
1979 16.6 .53 45.8 2146.9 12.9 17.8 74.8
1980 16.3 .53 45.8 2152.3 12.9 17.7 77.4
1981 16.7 .56 45.1 2096.2 13.0 17.6 80.0
1982 16.3 .56 45.1 2086.8 13.0 17.6 79.0
1983 17.1 .59 44.9 2036.6 13.2 17.4 77.8
1984 16.2 .59 44.9 2061.6 13.2 17.4 81.1
1985 16.9 .61 46.0 2149.7 13.5 17.1 81.2
1986 16.3 .61 46.5 2158.9 13.5 17.2 76.9
1987 16.7 .63 46.3 2156.5 13.6 17.3 83.5
1988 18.1 .64 46.5 2185.4 13.5 17.5 81.8
1989 17.7 .64 46.7 2203.7 13.6 17.6 78.9
1990 17.8 .65 46.7 2201.8 13.6 17.9 78.9
1991 17.7 .65 46.7 2212.1 13.5 18.3 80.9
1992 18.2 .66 46.4 2169.3 13.6 18.6 81.6
1993 19.9 .67 45.3 2111.9 13.6 18.9 86.4
1994 19.3 .66 46.2 2193.1 13.6 19.4 81.3
1995 18.6 .64 46.1 2218.4 13.6 19.6 80.4
1996 19.2 .66 46.4 2248.1 13.6 19.8 81.7
1997 19.3 .65 46.1 2213.4 13.6 20.1 85.8
1999 20.5 .66 46.2 2219.3 13.6 20.5 86.9
2001 20.8 .67 46.3 2217.2 13.6 20.6 87.4
B) GSOEP
Year Mean Wage SD log-Wage Weekly hours Yearly hours Yrs of schooling Experience Tenure
1984 21.4 .47 44.8 2289.0 11.8 21.8 12.6
1985 24.7 .53 44.4 2235.2 11.8 21.9 12.6
1986 24.3 .52 44.8 2258.2 11.9 22.1 12.6
1987 25.9 .52 44.5 2254.2 11.9 22.2 12.8
1988 26.7 .51 44.0 2236.2 11.9 22.6 13.1
1989 25.8 .47 44.7 2285.2 11.9 22.9 13.1
1990 25.5 .42 43.9 2275.9 12.0 23.3 13.1
1991 27.2 .45 44.0 2269.7 12.0 23.5 13.2
1992 29.1 .44 43.9 2273.5 12.1 23.6 12.8
1993 30.6 .44 43.7 2272.8 12.1 23.6 12.8
1994 31.0 .41 43.7 2267.4 12.1 24.0 13.2
1995 33.3 .47 43.8 2256.6 12.2 24.1 12.8
1996 33.4 .45 43.8 2265.3 12.2 24.2 12.1
1997 33.1 .43 44.1 2313.3 12.2 24.7 12.2
1998 36.3 .50 43.7 2262.5 12.2 27.5 13.1
1999 35.3 .50 43.8 2324.5 12.2 25.5 12.0
2000 36.7 .48 43.8 2324.7 12.3 27.1 12.3
2001 37.0 .44 44.1 2348.2 12.4 26.5 12.3
2002 38.8 .47 43.7 2334.3 12.4 27.5 12.6
Notes: The total number of observations in PSID is 65.492. The total number of observations in GSOEP is 14.270.
Tenure is measured in months in PSID in years in GSOEP. Experience is measured in years.
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ν , which has a standard normal distribution whose cumulative distribution
function is denoted by Φ. Then, we deﬁne the two following relations:
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In implementing (12) and (13) we discretize the state space such that H ∈ H ≡ {H1,H2,...,HNH},
z ∈ Z ≡ {z1,z2,...,zNZ}, and b ∈ B ≡ {logb1,logb2,...,logbNb}.32 Then we approximate the
value functions W0 and V 0 through the discrete functions f W0 : H×Z → R and e V 0 : H×B → R,
respectively. To evaluate f W0 and e V 0 at points outside the grids we use linear interpolation.
In solving the maximization problem in (12) we assume that ˆ h belongs to the discrete set
h ≡ {h1,h2,...,hNh}, where we set Nh = 1000, h1 = 0.1 and hNh = 0.9. This gives an
approximated decision rule ˜ h0 : H × Z → h. To determine the approximated decision rule
˜ z0
r : H × B → R we use the ﬁrst order condition of the maximization problem in (13):
e V 0  
(1 − δ)H,b −¯ b1

− f W0 ((1 − δ)H,zr) = 0
which we solve at all points in the set H × B by using the Brent’s method.
32We choose H1 = 0 and HNH equal to the endogenous upper bound of human capital given the
maximum work eﬀort; z1 = −4.0 and zNZ = 4.0 so as to lose only 0.006% of probability mass of a
standard normal distribution; bNb = exp(¯ b0) and b1 small but not zero. Finally, we set NH = 64,
NZ = 45 and Nb = 16.
43We approximate integrals in (12) and (13) as follows:
Z zNz
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where the approximation to the CDF of a standard normal e Φ(zi) is deﬁned recursively by




for any zi ∈ {z2,z3,...,zNz} with e Φ(z1) = 0. Here φ denotes the density function of a standard
normal. The integral in (15) is approximated by using a Newton-Coates quadrature. To evaluate
integrals for za / ∈ Z we linearly interpolate adjacent solutions.33
Given the number of extensions and the calibration method, we end up solving the model
economy for many diﬀerent combinations of parameters. This uncovers a problem with the
probability function pu (H,G). When γ is large enough the probability goes to zero very fast as
H falls. If pu (H,G) reached zero for a positive H, there would be a non-zero probability that
an unemployed worker gets trapped forever into unemployment, which would then become an
absorbing state. Our probability function pu (H,G) never reaches zero but gets very close to it
for low values of H when γ is large. To avoid possible problems during the simulation stage we
then impose a lower bound equal to ten percent to the function pu (H,G).
B.2 Finding the aggregate distribution
In order to ﬁnd the stationary distribution X of human capital and wage rate for employed
workers and human capital and unemployment utility for unemployed workers we construct a
sample of 10,000 individuals that we simulate for 850 periods. Then, for each individual, we
drop the ﬁrst 600 observations and we use the remaining observations (that correspond to 20
years of monthly data) to obtain a ﬁnite sample counterpart of X. This allows to calculate both
cross-sectional and time series statistics.
B.3 Matching targets
As described in Section 4, we have 15 parameters that characterize the US70 economy. Of
these parameters, 3 are either normalizations or taken from previous estimates (a, β and η)
while 4 (ps, α, θ and µ) have a direct counterpart in the data. The remaining 8 parameters
are chosen to minimize the distance between statistics from original data and model simulated
33We choose this approach to calculate (14) rather than a standard Gaussian quadrature method ﬁrst
because with a Gaussian method the accuracy of the solution tends to diﬀer substantially for diﬀerent
za ∈ Z and second because a Gaussian method is more expensive in computer time, since for every
possible za it requires to evaluate the integrand at several points outside Z.
44data. The distance function is the sum of the squared relative error between the simulated
and the data statistics. We use a standard simplex algorithm to minimize the loss function.
We proceed analogously when calculating parameter changes that characterize the US00 or the
EU00 economy.
C Derivation of equation (11) using the two period model




lnω0 + αlnH0 + (θ − 1)lnh0
. (16)
The log of the wage rate lnω0 evolves as
lnω0 = lnω + pe
 
H0
q (lnω2 − lnω) + 
where  denotes a zero mean expectational error. Now use equation (3) to approximate pe (H0)
and then linearize the resulting expression with respect to lnH0 and lnω around lnH and the
average logged wage rate lnω. After using the fact that H0 = ah we obtain:
lnω0 ' cons. + p1q (lnω2 − lnω)lnh + (1 − p0q)lnω +  (17)
where cons. is an appropriately deﬁned constant. By using the expression for logged hourly
wage at time zero analogous to (16) we obtain an expression for lnω that can be substituted
into (17). The resulting expression for lnω0 is then substituted into (16) so as to yield
lnw0 = cons. + (1 − p0q) lnw − (1 − θ)lnh0 + [α + p1q (lnω2 − lnω) + (1 − θ)(1 − p0q)]lnh + ε
(18)
where again cons. denotes an appropriately deﬁned constant and ε ≡  + α(1 − p0q)lnH. This
relation suggests estimating equation (11) in the text. The equation is the regression ran by
Bell and Freeman (2001) with the only diﬀerence that they do not control for current hours,
which may introduce a bias if θ is diﬀerent from one. Note that equation (18) predicts that an
increase in either the productivity elasticity to human capital, α, or in with-skill wage inequality,
(lnω2 − ln ¯ ω), makes ϕ7 increase. So ϕ7 is expected to have increased in the US and to have
hardly changed in Europe. This is the implication tested in Table 10.
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